IMMIGRATION
Immigration and the Allure of Inclusion
1

Ediberto Roman

INTRODUCTION
The legal predicament of Victor Navorski is a classic tale of a man
without a country and is unfortunately replete with metaphors for
the plight of immigrants to this land. Navorski’s saga begins when
he is detained at the border of the United States, which in his case is
at one of New York City’s airports. He is legally unable to leave his
port of entry and locale of detention because the government
of his homeland, Krakozhia, was recently overthrown and the
United States has not recognized the new regime. After surviving
in a legal and literal state of limbo for several months, Navorski
eventually musters up the courage to illegally cross the border by
leaving the airport in order to enter the United States and fulfill his
family’s dream.
Victor Navorski’s saga was not addressed in the media or
courtrooms but in theaters and home videos, as he is a fictional
2
character played by Tom Hanks in the film “The Terminal.”
Navorski’s character is based on the tragic real-life saga of Merhan
Karimi Nasseri, who after being expelled from Iran without a
passport has lived in France’s Charles de Gaulle Airport since
3
1988.
Nasseri has been unable to leave the French airport
because his briefcase containing legal documents, including a
refugee certificate permitting him to reside in England, were
1
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stolen in a French train station. Because it is based on fact, Nasseri’s
saga is obviously far more consequential; nonetheless, both stories
in many ways trace the trials of legal and illegal immigrants
throughout the Western world. These two stories reflect, in a
microcosm, the real-life trials of millions of immigrants; the
protagonists are faced with immigration regimes that are
apparently filled with arbitrary distinctions, irrational
motivations, and bureaucratic nightmares.
I.

IMMIGRANT STORIES

Essentially, all immigrant stories concern labels and their
consequences, including the fiction of the legal and illegal
5
“alien.”
These labels in turn are created by immigration
regimes that have the effect of establishing identities of both
welcomed and unwelcome newcomers into a society. These
fictions or labels occur within what can be described as the
legal fiction of the nation-state.
In many respects, all
immigrant debates and accounts are tales of inclusion and
membership within legal frameworks that decide which groups
of people are deemed worthy of eventual formal membership
within a political structure. Indeed, the label of “alien” situates
persons as “outside of ‘We the people’ and therefore places
6
them by definition as outsiders.
Typically, under western
immigration systems, those deemed worthy of membership are
classified as legal aliens or immigrants, who in turn are allowed
the right to convert their status to full participants within the
society, known as naturalized citizens. The naturalized citizens are
contrasted, in immigration parlance, with those that are
deemed to have entered the nation-state illegally; in other words
individuals who arrive in ways that are inconsistent with the
means deemed appropriate by the nation-state are deemed to be
illegal aliens. For all intents and purposes, illegal aliens, exist in
the shadows of the society with virtually no political presence or
rights. In fact, the label of illegal alien alone justifies the
disregard of any pretense of rights that should be afforded to
“legal” members of society. For instance, in explaining why
Haitians in the early 1990s were repatriated to their homeland
without any judicial or administrative process, in apparent
4
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violation of international law, President George H. Bush
7
declared that these individual were not refugees but “illegals.”
All too often, unfortunately for those groups in need or desire
of entry, the distinctions between the appropriate and
inappropriate methods of entry do not appear to be based
upon sound moral or legal grounds or justifications.
Both the Navorski and Nasseri stories contain symbolisms
that illustrate these ambiguities and arbitrary enforcement of
immigration laws. For instance, in both situations the victims
of the legal conundrums, through no fault of their own, were
prevented from leaving their peculiar place of detention—an
airport—and could not legally leave those confines in order to
fulfill their wishes of entering their targeted countries.
Using what is termed here as the Navorski-Nasseri
phenomenon as a rhetorical tool, this essay briefly reviews
aspects of the exclusionary history of domestic immigration law
and juxtaposes the rhetoric of inclusion associated with
immigration and this country’s history of racialized
exclusionary immigration practices. After describing the
apparent disconnect between notions of inclusiveness associated
with the rational structure of U.S. immigration law and
immigration policies in practice, this essay develops a fictional
analogy using three imaginary countries to highlight the
dramatic differences in the implementation of U.S. immigration
law. Against this backdrop, the essay then discusses the articles of
Maria Pabon Lopez, Jose Miguel Flores, and Arthur Read that are
part of the immigration cluster of LatCrit IX. The Lopez article
8
explores the aftermath of the Plyler v. Doe, decision and its affect on
undocumented children. The Flores piece explores the effect of
globalization on luring Latin American communities to the United
States. The Read piece questions the propriety of the President’s
proposed guest workers’ program.
II. THE FICTION OF INCLUSIVENESS UNDER
DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION REGIMES
America is all too often described as a nation of immigrants.
From the welcoming words at the feet of the statute of liberty inviting
the poor, the tired, and huddled masses yearning to be free, this
national creed or narrative suggest a welcoming and inclusive land.

7
8
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Notwithstanding the millions of immigrants that can bear witness to
this national narrative, the history of mass migration to this land is
also filled with examples of policies and practices that evince
anything other than a welcoming narrative. Perhaps the most
obvious disconnect between an inclusive national narrative and
practice is evidenced by this country’s treatment of racial minority
immigrants. While the United States is the among the most open
nations in terms of acceptance of immigrants, with hundred of
thousands admitted every year, the history of United States
immigration demonstrates that for people of color, and other
disfavored groups, legal immigration to this land was all too often an
elusive rather than an inclusive proposition. Professor Bill Ong Hing,
in his book, Defining American Through Immigration Policy, traces the
9
earliest manifestations of immigration limits. He notes that the fear
of foreigners motivated early attempts at immigration control;
including the 1798 Alien and Sedition laws which were aimed at
10
silencing political opposition and French revolutionaries. Similarly,
in his book The ‘Huddled Masses’ Myth, Dean Kevin Johnson traces
what he terms as the darker and harsher aspects of this country’s
11
immigration story.
Dean Johnson methodically traces the little12
known racialized history of exclusion in U.S. immigration laws. This
exclusionary history against racial minorities is believed to have
begun in the 1800’s with local, state, and federal exclusion and
13
mistreatment of Chinese immigrants.
These laws included:
Congress’ passage of the Chinese exclusion laws that effectively
14
barred all Chinese immigration, and the Supreme Court’s
endorsement of Congress’s virtually absolute power to exclude
15
foreigners in The Chinese Exclusion Case. Other examples include:
the 1907-1908 Gentleman’s Agreement between the U.S. and Japan,
16
which severely restricted Japanese immigration, The Immigration
9
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Act of 1917 which expanded exclusion of immigration to the “Asiatic
17
the naturalization law system that limited
barred zone;”
naturalization to “White” and after a civil war to African ancestry
18
immigrants.
Subsequent exclusionary acts include the 1924
National Quota System, which was designed to “ensure stability in the
19
ethnic composition of the United States.”
There are also,
20
unfortunately, more recent manifestations of racial exclusion. For
instance, there is the Immigration Act of 1965, though often viewed
as progressive and liberalizing, nonetheless imposed a 120,000 person
ceiling on migration from the Western Hemisphere. This limitation
was part of a compromise to the fear of a drastic increase in
21
immigration from Latin America. The motivations behind the
Reagan administration’s commencement of the interdiction and
repatriation of Haitian nationals seeking admittance to land is also
22
subject of considerable criticism. The George H. Bush, Bill Clinton,
and George W. Bush administrations have all followed this policy of
aggressive Coast Guard interdiction at sea and summary denials of
asylum claims by Immigration and Naturalization Service officials.
Professor Steve Legomsky examined this policy and concluded “[t]he
public would never [have accepted] this if the boat people were
23
Europeans.” As one author described, “In the end, asylum seekers
from Haiti, one of the few nations near the United States with a large
black population, suffered some of the hardest treatment imaginable
24
at the hands of the U.S. government.”
III. IMMIGRATION REGIMES AND THE CITIZENSHIP CONSTRUCT
Exclusionary raced-based acts against immigrants of color are
not now championed by the government as the basis for its practices
and should obviously never have been the hallmarks of any rational
immigration regime. Immigration regimes should be based on
rational economic, political, and humanitarian policies relating to
both the desires of entrants to a land and the receiving country’s
STATES SINCE 1850 pp. 123-28 (1988).
17
Immigration Act of 1917, Ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-76 (1917).
18
I AN H ANEY L OPEZ , W HITE BY L AW : THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996).
19
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20
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21
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22
Id. at 40
23
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1992, at 2A (quoting Legomsky).
24
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interest and ability to accept those entrants. Thus, immigration
affects both bodies that move and the juridical status or label that is
imposed upon them by virtue of whether the government of
destination is accepting of those movements. In other words,
immigration concerns both a physical phenomenon and legal
construction through labels such as “alien” and “citizen,” which
define who are the members of society and who are unwelcome.
Immigration, as a legal construct, is thus one of the primary vehicles
used to create a status that both creates identity and defines
membership. At least in Western constructions, those who enjoy the
preferred status of full social and political participants of society are
25
recognized as the “citizens.” Persons with citizenship status stand in
sharp contrast with those with silenced, marginalized, and limited
rights holders of a society, known as aliens. Immigration law is thus
“illuminating resource for studying the place of domestic groups in
26
the U.S. social hierarchy.” Through this legal regime, “the
government is afforded free reign to treat non-citizens . . . as it sees
27
fit.” As demonstrated above, this discretion has facilitated the
disconnect between the treatment of minority immigrants to the
rhetoric of inclusion associated with domestic immigration.
Specifically, despite the fact that most Americans are
descendants of immigrants and the national character of this
welcoming and embracing land to immigrants is evidenced by
Emma Lazarus’ timeless declaration in the New Colossus poem,
racial minorities have largely not faced a welcoming land
throughout the history of this land. Nonetheless, the vast
majority of Americans abide by the popular belief that holds that
to be an American citizen, a person did not have to be of any
particular national, linguistic, religious, or ethnic background.
All he or she had to do was commit him or herself to the political
ideology centered on the abstract ideas of liberty, equality, and
republicanism.
Thus, the universal ideological character of
American nationality is largely believed to be open to anyone who
legally enters this land and has the will to become an American citizen.
The central discussion of the citizenship concept in the United
States Constitution is addressed in the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides: “All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
25
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28

the United States, and the state wherein they reside.” This fairly
straightforward clause establishes two basic ways to achieve
citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) through naturalization.
Citizenship by birth can occur by being born within the physical
boundaries of this land, also known as jus soli, which in Latin means
by soil. The second means to acquire citizenship by birth is jus
sanguinis, which in Latin means by blood, by being born outside
29
United States’ territory to one or both United States citizen parents.
The other means to attain official membership or citizenship is
through naturalization--the process that an immigrant may
undertake if he or she chooses to become a citizen. Naturalization
creates citizenship status through the means and process set forth
by Congressional enactment. As a result, though the applicant
initiates the naturalization process, once begun, the applicant
nonetheless does not control whether he or she will be deemed
to have earned the right to be a citizen.
The ultimate goal for many immigrants is to become a
permanent resident or citizen. The interest in becoming a citizen
is understandable because citizenship is a broad concept that is
supposed to signify the rights afforded and obligations imposed in
the Constitution, but also is supposed to guarantee an “individual’s
membership in a political community and the resulting
relationship between allegiance and protection that binds the
citizen and the state. It includes the sense of permanent
inclusion in the political community in a non-subordinate
30
condition. Practically speaking, citizenship also allows one to seek
eligibility for the full compliment of economic rights and
government largess provided to citizens. Thus, theoretically
citizenship signifies an individual’s “full membership” in a
community where the ideal of equal membership is theoretically to
31
Scholars have argued that because equality and
prevail.
belonging are inseparably linked, to acknowledge citizenship is
32
to confer “belonging” to the United States.
28
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IV. CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION LAW
Despite being within a legal framework with a history that is
less than pristine, the primary United States immigration statute,
which establishes a largely rational paradigm for those seeking to
legally enter and stay in this land, is the Immigration and
33
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952. Though this statute is a
contemporary immigration statute that set forth this country’s
mandate concerning immigration, even this act contains vestiges
of antiquated exclusionary regimes. Nonetheless, pursuant to its
effort to create a rational and just system, under the INA there are
34
several types of immigrants, including labor migrants,
35
36
professional migrants, entrepreneurial migrants, and refugees
37
and asylees. The INA also recognizes a system where otherwise
deportable or inadmissible aliens may seek safe haven in this country
38
if they are in fear of persecution by forces in their homeland. Over
2 observed that "to all general purposes we have uniformly been one peopleeach individual citizen every where [sic] enjoying the same national rights,
privileges and protection." T HE F EDERALIST No. 2, at 10 (John Jay) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). Madison in Federalist No. 57 observed "who are to be the
electors of the Representatives [in Congress.] Not the rich more than the
poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the naughty heirs of
distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious
fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United
States. No qualifications of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil
profession are permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of
the people." T HE F EDERALIST No. 57, (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). Scholars have also agreed that the concept of citizenship is associated with
notions of equality. Professor Ackerman observed that "[in claiming citizenship,
an individual - is first and foremost - asserting the existence of a social relationship
between himself and others. More specifically, a citizen is (by definition)
someone who can properly claim the right to be treated as a fellow member of
the political community. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, 74
(Yale University, 1980). Professor Fox, who recently examined the history of the
term, observed that while "Madison and the other authors of The Federalist
Papers may have had little to say about the substance of ... citizenship, they did
believe that such a thing existed, that it defined a sphere of equality." James W.
Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism, 1787-1882, 60 U. P I T T . L. REV. 421
(1999). James Kettner similarly noted "revolution created the Status of
`America citizen' and produced an expression of the general principles that
ought to govern membership in a free society ... and it ought to confer equal
rights." JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1807 (1978).
33
See Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952); U.S.C. 1101 et. seq.
34
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 25, at 276.
35
Id. at 277.
36
Id. at 278.
37
Id. at 280.
38
Note, Membership Has Its Privileges and Immunities: Congressional Power to
Define and Enforce the Rights of National Citizenship, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1925, 1932
(1989).
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the years, after enactment of the INA, amendments to that statute
were passed to affect the admissibility of several groups of immigrants
and asylum seekers. These amendments facilitated the ability of
certain groups to emigrate, permanently reside, and become
citizens in this land. Many of the policies of the INA, despite
effectively noting the beginning of the end of mid-century race-based
race quotas to immigration, initiated other policies that continued to
raise questions concerning the motivations of the act. For instance,
the 1952 amendments included in the list of individuals to be
excluded from immigration those who were “afflicted with psychotic
39
personality.” After the provision was struck down by the Ninth
40
Circuit in Fleuti v. Rosenberg, the Act was amended to exclude those
afflicted with “sexual deviation.” Immigration scholars have
concluded that these amendments were intended to exclude gays and
41
lesbians.
Another example of controversy associated with the
contemporary regime is the 1965 amendments to the INA, which
eliminated the discriminatory quota system of dating back to the
1920s, but initiated the use of discriminatory diversity visas. These
diversity visas limited immigration from the western hemisphere to
120,000 persons. This change had its intended affect of limiting
42
Latino/a immigration.
Given America’s repeated examples of its reluctance to accept
racial minorities as legal immigrants, it is not difficult to appreciate
why there may be some cynicism and differing impressions
concerning the inclusive rhetoric of immigration. This in turn
may leave many immigrants, who in recent times are
perceived to be largely from Central and South America, with
the impression they face entering a land that is not nearly as
welcoming as its national narrative declares. The practices of
interdiction at sea and aggressive border patrols make this view
abundantly clear. The cynicism with respect to this country’s
immigration rules is perhaps best highlighted by the film “The
Terminal.” The utterly arbitrary reason for denying Navorski’s
entry merely because his homeland changes governments
appears analogous to the denial of or limits on immigration for
certain groups merely because of where a person is from or
whether we oppose the political structure of the immigrant’s
39

8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (4) (1952).
302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962). See also William B. Turner, Lesbian/Gay Rights
and Immigration Policy: Lobbying to End the Medical Model, 7 J. Pol’y Hist. 208-25
(1995).
41
HING, supra note 9, at 82-91; J OHNSON , supra note 11, at 140-51.
42
J OHNSON , supra note 11, at 25.
40
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homeland. There is an irony in that the fictional portrayal of
Victor Navorski is probably an enormously effective and nonthreatening means to address struggles for identity and inclusion
faced by immigrant groups. Navorski’s, tale is also so engulfing
because of its plethora of statements concerning this country’s
identity and acceptance of outsiders. For instance, shortly
before he is stopped at the airport, Navorski witnesses scores of
other foreigners arriving and departing the airport area, yet
upon first being detained, he cannot understand why he is
unable to even step a foot outside the airport. While in the film the
basis for the other individual cases of immigration is not
discernable, outside the explicitly fictional world of film, the
immigration policies of the U.S. and most western nation-states
all too often do not appear more coherent than something out
of a fictional tale like The Terminal. The sheer absurdity of
Navorski’s exclusion is due to a regime change in his homeland,
which leaves him literally “stuck at the border.”
Similarly, in the far more troubling real life travesty of
Merhan Nasseri, the French government has prevented him
from leaving an airport for over a decade because he was of
being expelled from his homeland for protesting against a
43
dictator and then had his legal documents stolen.
Unfortunately, Navorski and Nasseri’s troubles are not unlike the
apparent arbitrariness associated with legal distinctions drawn to
permit and prevent individuals seeking entrance into the
United States. Not unlike the arbitrary practices in the film,
contemporary domestic immigration policies, while framed as
rational policies deemed to protect the economic and political
integrity of the country’s infrastructure, upon, closer
examination, raise questions as to whether the application of
immigration laws are affected by illegitimate grounds such as
the racial identity or privileged political status of the immigrant.
Navorski’s general interest in entering this country was not
unlike the hundreds of other travelers depicted in the film.
However, because of circumstances beyond his control, namely
the coup d’etat that occurred in his homeland, he is deemed, as
44
the film depicts, ”unacceptable.” The film therefore ultimately
43

See supra note 4.
Prior to the enactment of the illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, a noncitizen denied admission at a
port of entry into this country was considered an “excludable,” the act
replaced that label with the work “removal.” A noncitizen denied admission at a
port of entry into this country was considered an “excludable,” the act replaced that
44
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proves to be a provocative critique of how this government treats
outsiders and foreigners.
In the actual events in which the film is based, the victim
of arbitrary entry rules, Merhan Nasseri has been unable to
leave a French airport for over a decade. If Nasseri was
detained in a U.S. airport and had other, perhaps preferred,
identity markers, such as originating from a communist country,
instead of theocracy-based dictatorship, he probably would not be
detained indefinitely at an airport. Nasseri, however, is left with no
alternative but to live off of the assistance of his adoptive airport
family. This problematic condition is exacerbated by the fact that
over the years, Nasseri’s physical and mental health has been in a
45
rapid state of decline. The arbitrariness faced by both Nasseri
and Navorski, described here as the Nasseri-Navorski
Phenomenon, can often be evidenced in how in practice this
country often draws lines and deems otherwise similarly situated
peoples ineligible for entry. This perceived arbitrariness is
highlighted when racial constructions are implicated.
V. ENTERLAND, EXILIOLAND, AND NEVERENTERLAND:
CITIZENSHIP AS A NONFICTION GENRE
A quick reference to this country’s treatment of three
similar and neighboring peoples illustrates the arbitrary
distinctions that affect immigrant groups desirous of entering
this land. In addition, when examining the treatment of the
immigrants from these lands, questions arise whether the
disparate treatment is at least in part due to racial
constructions. One need not look much further than a few
hundred miles to the south of the State of Florida to appreciate a
Nasseri-Navorski phenomenon. In the tales of the three lands
described below, the imagined quality of immigration and
membership are highlighted. Despite similar locales and histories,
but vastly differing constructions of race, the immigration and
emigration positions of these three peoples are dramatically
disparate. The first of these people are from the land that will be
called “Enterland.” As the name suggests, the people of this country
can enter and leave freely to and from the United States. They are a
people from the Caribbean who are not much different from the
nationals of nearby islands. Though their native tongue is
label with the word “removal.”
45
See Matthew Rose, Waiting for Spielberg, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003 (Sept. 2), 2003
at 82.
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Spanish, their culture, like those of the people of the surrounding
countries, largely derives from African, indigenous, and peninsular
roots. As a result of historical happenstance, this country and by
46
extension its people are formally part of the United States. These
people never chose to become part of the United States; they just
47
happen to live in a land that became the booty of war. Though
the people of this land are U.S. citizens they do not share the
same rights of other Fourteenth Amendment U.S. citizens within the
mainland U.S. or U.S. citizens living in another country, for that
matter.
Though these people may exist in a subordinate citizenship
status, it is that very status that has nevertheless provided them with a
48
preferred migration status.
Specifically, despite the fact that
nationals of this land are not equal citizens in that they do not
have formal representation in the government that controls their
49
lives, their anomalous status empowers them with the right to freely
50
enter, leave, and even reside in the U.S. mainland.
When one
compares them to similarly situated island people of the Caribbean,
one can readily take note of the fact that they are similar to many
in this region that are deemed as a matter of law far less acceptable
51
or worthy of residing in the U.S. Unlike most other Caribbean
people, or nationals from just about any other country for that
matter, if the people of Enterland wish to enter and stay in the
United States, they can do so for any reason and without any
52
restrictions. In fact, they may enter for cultural, political, or
purely economic reasons. All they have to do is purchase or
otherwise obtain a ticket and board an airplane bound for the
United States. The primary reason for the status of this group is
that their land and its people were acquired by the U.S. after
53
the Spanish-American War. As a result, the people of this island
group have both a subordinate status under a legal regime of
U.S. citizenship, but a preferred status under the U.S.

46

Ediberto Roman, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and other Consequences of U.S.
Colonialism, 26 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
47
EFREN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY (American
Psychological Association, Wash. D.C. 2001).
48
Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42
V ILL . L. R EV . 1119 (1997).
49
Id.
50
See supra note 29, at 3.
51
Id.
52
FRANCISCO A. SCARANO, PUERTO RICO (McGraw Hill 1993).
53
See supra note 30, at 55; supra note 29, at 5; supra note 31, at 1121.
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immigration regime vis-à-vis other aliens who do not enjoy
mainland citizenship.
The people of the second group are from the country
called “Exilioland.” These people, like the people of Enterland,
primarily speak Spanish and are made up of peoples from
Africa, Spain, and indigenous descendants. In fact, in
anthropological circles, the people of Enterland and Exilioland
are widely believed to be originally from the same or similar
Awarak Indian tribes. Though the people of Exilioland are not
formal members of the United States, the people of this group
are deemed to be a politically desirable group. In large
measure this is because these people are inhabitants of a
repressive dictatorial regime whose political philosophy is
antithetical to the United States’ interests in the region. Others,
who are perhaps more sympathetic to that regime, would note
that Exilioland is also the only country in the hemisphere which
has steadfastly opposed the United States’ hegemonic geopolitical interests in the region. In either case, the people of
this land are also arguably more acceptable in large measure
because of their value as ideological trophies: they live under a
repressive government that follows a political system, namely
Communism that is deemed repugnant to this land’s democratic
54
system of governance. The people of this group have the
ability to stay in this country if they merely touch dry land. As
such, the people of this group hold a preferred immigrant or
entrance status, although the people of this group often reject
the notion that they are in fact immigrants, instead claiming an
exile status. In fact, as a result of the 1965 amendments to the
INA, Congress adopted a new preference designed to broaden
55
overseas refugee programs.
Persons could qualify for this
program by establishing that they had “fled” persecution in a
56
“communist or communist-dominated country.” As a result of those
amendments, under current immigration laws, the people of this
group are presumed to be political asylum seekers-despite any
attendant economic motives for emigration-and are virtually always
54
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allowed to stay in the U.S. and they are allowed to become U.S.
residents faster than any other exile, asylum, or immigrant
57
group.
In the immigration “wet-foot, dry-foot” legal distinction,
basically created for this group of people, the federal government
58
of this land created a special status for this group. This policy was
nevertheless more restrictive than previous policies aimed at people
from such lands such as Exilioland. Unlike other immigrant or
exile groups seeking asylum, the people of this land are allowed to
stay in this land irrespective of whether they can prove a well-founded
59
fear of persecution.
Like the people of Enterland, some of the
people of Exilioland may seek to migrate to the mainland U.S. for
60
economic or other reasons.
Nevertheless, the people of
Exilioland are essentially legally deemed to always arrive for political
asylum reasons, irrespective of whether their undisclosed reasons
61
were primarily based upon economic necessity or other concerns.
Though some have suggested that the rationale for the unique
presumed-asylum status of these people is because this group is
extraordinarily politically active and has a powerful voice in the State
62
of Florida, which has often been a pivotal state in national elections,
the rationale behind or irrationality of such law applicable to this
group is beyond the reach of this essay. What is relevant to this
project is that despite the fact the first two Caribbean people have
similar histories, originate from similar peoples, experience
similar histories as colonies of Spain, gained their independence
from Spain in the same armed conflict, and arguably were
controlled by the U.S., at least for a certain period, their
63
immigration status is dramatically different.
Members of one group, because they are part of the United
States’ colonial possessions and are ostensibly U.S. citizens, may enter
and leave the U.S. Members of the other group, however, because of
57
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this government’s stance against communism and perhaps the
proximity of their homeland to the United States, are able to
obtain an expedited asylum status only upon touching dry land
of the continental U.S. However, the ability of the people of
Exilioland to immigrate to the U.S. is significantly more challenging
than that of the people of Enterland. The people of Enterland,
because of century-old legal fictions that declared that Enterland is
paradoxically both foreign and domestic, are deemed worthy of entry
without having to struggle to literally touch United States soil. The
people of Exilioland must defy their homeland’s repressive laws,
illegally emigrate, and touch dry land. Recent events have
exemplified the absurdity and arbitrariness of such requirements.
In an actual fact pattern that is probably more peculiar than most
law professors could envision when drafting a final exam, on
January 4, 2006, a group of 15 individuals from Exilioland were
able to touch “dry-land” by landing on a section of the old Seven
64
Mile Bridge off the coast of the Florida Keys. Despite evidently
achieving the threshold marker for entry—touching dry land—
federal immigration officials ruled that because the bridge was
not currently used by pedestrians and is not actually “touching
one of the Keys, the bridge was not in fact dry land. In yet
another vivid example of the peculiar immigration rules of this
land, the immigrants were deemed never touched dry land and
were then repatriated to their homelands, undoubtedly facing
reprisals from that government. Recently, the federal government
agreed to exam the propriety of the “wet- foot, dry-foot” policy in
part due to a hunger strike initiated by a local political and
community leader of the Exilioland people residing in the United
States.
The people of Exilioland, because of their closed society,
unlike those in Enterland, cannot simply take an airline flight to
the United States. Instead, they must risk their lives, often in
makeshift boats, in shark-infested high seas in order to touch U.S.
land. Moreover, the people of Exilioland, unlike the people of
Enterland, are not able to readily and easily return to their
homeland.
The people of the third island group come from a land
called “Neverenterland.” These people like the people of
Enterland and Exilioland, reside on an island in the Caribbean,
were once colonial subjects, and derive from Indigenous, African,
64
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and European cultures, yet are deemed largely unacceptable or
ineligible for any immigration status that will easily permit them
65
entrance. In addition, in racial construction terminology they also
happen to be considered black. It is the racial construction of
these people that is arguably the greatest difference in the
perception of these otherwise similarly situated and constructed
people. The people of Neverenterland are not part of the U.S.
colonial landscape and do not reside within a political
66
framework that is threatening to the United States. Despite the
fact that they reside only a few hundred miles away from
Exilioland and Enterland in arguably the same Archipelago of
67
islands known as the Antilles, these people are neither free to
enter the United States or are deemed worthy of easily applying
68
for political asylum. When they arrive on U.S. land, even if they
touch dry land, they are deemed to be in this country solely for
economic reasons and under this country’s current immigration
69
regime are presumptively ineligible to stay in the country.
Despite the fact that the people of Enterland essentially seek to come
to this land for economic reasons, they are allowed to do so without
ever facing any perilous journeys at sea. Yet the people of
Neverenterland routinely risk their lives in dangerously overcrowded
makeshift transport boats, and are rarely allowed to remain within
70
the U.S.
Unlike the people of Exilioland, even if the people of
Neverenterland touch dry land, they typically cannot stay in this
country. They are deemed to be “ineligible” under domestic
immigration law or “unacceptable” as it is described in the film The
Terminal. In many respects Victor Navorski, though in the film he
is apparently from a European Country, his disparate treatment
makes him resemble someone from Neverenterland rather than
Krakozhia. The people of Neverenterland are constructed as
unworthy entrants who arrive solely for economic reasons, and
despite Emma Lazarus’ noble national narrative and an
economic system that hails economic upward mobility, under
current domestic immigration policies, an economic motivation
65
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for entry is an insufficient reason for with exception to those from
71
Enterland, to be permitted to stay in this country.
As one may by now appreciate, the people of Enterland,
Exilioland, and Neverenterland are actually from Puerto Rico, Cuba,
and Haiti, respectively. As addressed above, these people live in then
same island region, have similar histories, often seek to arrive in this
72
land for a better life, but are treated differently. While the author
of this essay appreciates that this country cannot easily allow any and
all people to migrate, what is sought here is to highlight, not unlike
the portrayal in The Terminal, the questionable and troubling lines
drawn and the fictions created to exclude some and include others.
This is not to say that the people of Cuba or Puerto Rico are unworthy
of entering and staying within the United States, but the fact is
that many of the interests of the people of Puerto Rico, and
arguably for many from Cuba, in arriving probably have more to do
with quality of life issues, such as economics than with political
statements, yet both groups are able to stay when they arrive in this
land. Although the people of Haiti live in a desperate economic
state and political repression not too dissimilar to the plight of
the people of Cuba, They are not allowed to stay in this land, even
upon touching dry land. In fact, referring back for a moment to the
recent debate revolving around the 15 Cuban migrants who recently
had the misfortune of landing on an old bridge, although many
opponents of the wet-foot, dry foot policy have sound reason to
challenge that policy, cynics of immigration priorities may argue
with some force that but for the Cuban community’s influence in
local politics in the pivotal State of Florida in national elections, the
federal government would not have agreed to revisit its odd wet-foot,
dry-foot distinction for Cuban migrants. Indeed it is likely that 100
hunger strikers from Haiti would not have caused such an
immediate response by the federal government. Ironically, Haitian
immigrants to this land are neither politically influential in national
73
politics, and paradoxically did not have the good “fortune” to have
been colonized by the United States, and as a result are unwelcome
74
to stay in this land.
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VI. THEORETICAL CHALLENGES TO THE CITIZENSHIP NARRATIVE
The Nasseri-Navorski phenomenon is also used here to
highlight the arbitrariness of immigration rules and regulations
touched upon by the articles in the immigration cluster of the IX
Annual LatCrit Conference. While the articles themselves are
difficult to unify other than by noting, in the broadest sense,
their common themes, they do in one form or another note
the peculiar consequences of immigration priorities. The
three articles in the immigration cluster highlight the
vulnerable and anomalous status of alien groups within this
land. The articles of Jose Miguel Flores, Maria Pabon Lopez,
and Arthur Read provide diverse writings touching upon often
75
arbitrary rules of exclusion and inclusion.
The articles
question the legal creations used to define which groups can stay
and actively participate in all affairs in this land. Stemming from a
panel touching upon immigration, educational access, and
social justice. The articles address a host of provocative issues
related to the contemporary immigration debate. In fact, the
ironies and injustices addressed by the works fit within the
metaphors raised by the Nasseri-Navorski Phenomenon.
In the first article, Lopez explores the issue of the right to
education as applied to undocumented Latina and Latino
76
children. She argues that the so-called “immigration crisis” in
the public’s imagination has led to state and federal
governmental restrictions on the ability of Latina and Latino
77
groups to effectively participate in all aspects of society. In part
because of the fear of foreigners heightened by the postSeptember 11, 2001 world, the efforts at restrictions have
included limits on the ability of non-citizens to obtain driver’s
78
79
80
licenses, access to health care, access to public assistance and
81
access to education. Lopez characterizes the children of
75
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undocumented parents as hostages in the immigration crises,
particularly in their access to effective education. She argues this
plight exists despite the United States Supreme Court’s decision
82
in Plyler v. Doe, which held that undocumented children are
entitled to state funded education. Based on the Plyler decision,
Lopez observes that undocumented children’s right to
education should have been secure without any efforts to limit
that right. Despite the pronouncement of Plyler, Lopez argues that
these vulnerable students continue to face severe challenges in
educational access and achievement. For instance, she notes that
83
84
85
state efforts in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, have
attempted to dismantle bilingual education. In essence, Lopez’s
central thesis is that in an era antagonistic to immigrants, Latina
and Latino children, particularly those of undocumented workers,
are the most at risk.
In the year that so many institutions in the legal academy have
celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the groundbreaking decision
86
of Brown v. Board of Education, Lopez questions the impact of Plyler
and laments the failure of courts and scholars to use that
87
decision to assist undocumented children. The paper argues that
Plyler must be read as an integral part of Brown’s legacy and notes that
education, though not currently formalized as a fundamental right
by U.S. constitutional law, is an essential aspect of membership in this
society.
The Lopez article is of some moment in that it advocates for
greater emphasis on a decision that speaks not only to the
importance of education, but also to the reality that children of
undocumented workers are part of this society. The piece effectively
highlights a perhaps underappreciated decision in terms of its
importance to the right of education and the rights of
88
undocumented children. Somewhat surprisingly, the article does
not, however, use the decisions in Plyler, Brown, and the recent
457 U.S. at 220.
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Supreme Court affirmative action decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger, and
90
Grutter v. Bollinger, which are also addressed in the article, to
advocate for the recognition of education as a fundamental right.
91
Though the San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
decision, which refused to hold that education is a fundamental
right, was re-affirmed in Plyler, advocates of the rights of
undocumented children nonetheless should question San Antonio’s
logic and constitutional basis. From a political perspective,
without the recognition of education as fundamental right,
undocumented children will continue to be at risk and subject
to political whim. The primary basis for the Supreme Court’s
refusal in San Antonio to recognize the fundamental nature of
education stems from the fact that education is not an
92
enumerated right in the Constitution. What the San Antonio
Court failed to acknowledge was that there are numerous
fundamental rights that are not enumerated in the
93
Constitution. Those rights include the right to marry, the
94
95
right to travel, the right to raise children, and the right to
96
procreate. As Lopez illustrates, under the current educational
as well as immigration regime, the most vulnerable in our
society have continuously been subject to attack. She illustrates
that as recently as the year 1996; two federal proposals would
have effectively overruled Plyler. In two proposed amendments to
the Illegal Immigration reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
97
(“IIRIRA”), Representative Elton Gallegly failed but almost
98
further limited the rights of the undocumented. Lopez further
points out that at the state level, California’s anti-immigrant
Proposition 187, if it had not been struck down, contained a
99
provision that was designed to overrule Plyler. Without the
recognition of education as a fundamental right it is unlikely
that the status of undocumented children will change much for
89
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100

the better. Thus, Lopez effectively highlights that in the current
intolerant and arbitrary immigration system, the most
vulnerable of innocents are often subject to legal attack merely
because this society is antagonistic to the parents of those
innocents. The Lopez article demonstrates that in the context
of education, undocumented children fit within the NasseriNavorski Phenomenon. Not unlike Navorski, who is given the
right to stay at the airport border until his legal status is
resolved but is repeatedly stifled in his efforts to feed himself,
undocumented children were theoretically granted the right to
public education in Plyler, but have often had that right
challenged and in practice limited. While Navorski was
afforded a right, lodging without food, that right was illusory.
Though Plyler similarly afforded the children of the
undocumented public education, repeated efforts at curbing
immigrant rights, Lopez argues, have devalued the value of
Plyler.
In the second article of this cluster, Jose Miguel Flores
addresses issues touching upon what he describes as
“globalization from below,” or in other words globalization’s
effect of luring Latina and Latino communities to American
cities. Interestingly enough, many observations made by Flores
concerning Asian and Latina migration into cities do not squarely
fit within the Navorski-Nasseri phenomenon termed here, but
the themes raised in the Flores piece do track statements made
in the film The Terminal. For instance, because Navorski’s
interim home was in the airport, those who came to his aid were
people of color who found economic opportunity in the airport.
Flores notes that in many immigrant communities, other
immigrant groups created institutions of support. For instance,
Flores argues that as a result of globalization, new forms of
participation and representation are developing in immigrant
communities. This observation is perhaps the most interesting
portion of the article in that the author uses vivid examples of
the creation of transnational economic networks, including
entities such as the Tepeyac Association of New York, which
provides cultural support to Mexican immigrant communities. A
similar notion of self-empowerment could be observed in the

100
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Terminal when individuals representing minority or outsider
groups in the airport provided Navorski with food and social
support.
In what could be described as a sociologically focused
project, without a significant emphasis on immigration or the
other domestic laws, Flores observes that as a result of
globalization, Latinas and Latinos “are lured to America’s cities
by the economic forces.” While this thesis is interesting, how this
recent migration differs from migration throughout the last
century is not explored by the Flores article. Nonetheless, the
piece makes some worthwhile observations. By examining the
Latina and Latino migration in New York’s Jackson Heights and
Los Angeles’ Boyle Heights, Flores attempts to highlight the new
mestizaje or the mixing of cultural forces occurring in American
cities. Another question is raised by this part of the thesis,
namely, whether this mixing of cultures is a byproduct of
globalization, trends of migration, or other forces. Nonetheless,
Flores in a cogent fashion traces the changing face of American
cities as well as the development of networks of immigrantcentered programs.
The third article in the cluster, written by Arthur Read, is
perhaps the most provocative and ambitious in that it squarely
confronts a policy that is often characterized as benefiting new
immigrant workers. The article questions the propriety of
temporary or guest workers programs, which he argues all too often
disproportionally affect immigrant and minority communities.
Specifically, the article challenges President Bush’s efforts at
characterizing the expansion of such programs as immigration
reform.
In his advocacy for expanded temporary worker’s programs, the
President argued that under his proposal, the program will match
the employers with temporary workers, when American employers
101
cannot fill job openings with Americans.
In return, according
to the President, the workers will obtain a provisional legal status as
102
well as employment. Once again, a related subject was depicted
in the rhetorical tool used here to organize these articles-The
Terminal. Not unlike the only real choice undocumented workers
101
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often have for employment, Navorski was left with no other alternative
to make a livelihood other than to take an illegal or “off the books”
construction job. In part what makes the Read article so insightful is
that it challenges an effort proposed by the President which was
promoted as a vehicle of immigration reform aimed at providing
legal employment opportunities for otherwise undocumented
103
workers. Read characterizes the President’s proposals as “the big
104
In somewhat summary fashion, the article points out that
lies.”
the primary reason that employers interested in such programs
cannot find American workers is because they are unwilling to pay
105
living wages. The article compares the President’s proposal with
the 1942 “Bracero” program, which the article suggests led to abuses.
In essence, the article points out that the proposed expanded
temporary workers program ultimately harms all workers. In
what is perhaps the only suggestion a reader may have for this
piece is that in a relatively brief fashion the article raises so
many interesting points and sets forth so many interesting
arguments, that the project begs for a more expansive
examination of the subject. In addition, the article makes only
passing reference to the economic costs of its proposals.
Nevertheless, this is an impressive work that is so important
and thoughtful that it will likely lead to further works on the
subject. For instance, in a persuasive summation of his
argument, Read observes:
When the rights of undocumented and migrant workers are not
protected, the rights of all workers are diminished. Unscrupulous
employers seek out undocumented immigrants or temporary
workers because they believe that there are no consequences
for violating their rights. These employers gain a competitive
advantage over employers who abide by the law. This creates a
perverse incentive for employers to hire undocumented
106
workers, over citizens or authorized workers.
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LEGAL LIFE AS FICTION
In conclusion, both Nasseri and his fictional alter ego,
Victor Navorski, exist in many ways in a status that similar to
the odd immigration status of the Caribbean people of Haiti.
Both Nasseri and Navorski were placed in a strange place
where they should have been deemed eligible immigrants
and visitors, but were nonetheless are deemed unworthy of
entry due to forces outside their control. This essay
similarly compares the national narrative of “the land of
immigrants” and the welcoming invitations to the “hungry
and huddled masses yearning to breathe freely” with a
history of exclusionary policies that were immorally aimed
at excluding disfavored groups. Politics and prejudice, and
not
cogent
economic,
political,
or
humanitarian
considerations, have for too long been the basis for a
considerable portion of our immigration regimes. Each of
the articles in the LatCrit cluster examines provocative
immigration issues and likewise questions and explores what
appears to be a peculiar and often times arbitrary legal
regimes. These articles also arguably g o beyond their explicit
statements concerning immigration; they also speak to issues
touching upon the legal construction of membership and
otherness. As these articles point out, opportunity,
participation, membership, and immigration are inseparably
linked. All too often the rhetoric of membership has
conflicted with reality when one bothers to explore the
history of people of color seeking membership. The articles in
this cluster aptly highlight contemporary manifestations of this
tension. By examining the failure of formal legal approaches
to provide meaningful opportunities, and humane reform, the
articles critique the real life struggles of outsiders within a
legal framework that often does not live up to its purported
basis or rationality.

